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Abstract  
This dissertation examines the main instrument of the European Union climate 
policy, the emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) during its first years. Emission 
trading provides a cost-efficient way to reduce emissions. It creates a price on 
carbon dioxide and thereby incentives for cleaner production. The four empirical 
studies in this dissertation provide new information on the price determination in 
the emissions trading market, market efficiency and market interactions with the 
electricity markets. This information is useful for many purposes. It benefits the 
market participants who make choice between trading of emission allowances in 
the market and abatement of emissions. For the authorities and policy planners 
the price signal and the efficiency of the markets reveal unique real-time 
information on marginal abatement costs, impacts of policy decisions and 
impacts of institutional design of this policy instrument.  
To be a well-functioning policy instrument the EU ETS should create a credible 
price signal and efficient markets for trading allowances. The objective of this 
dissertation is to analyze the EU ETS markets and the price of the European 
Union emissions allowance, EUA, with econometric time series models. A large 
data set on market fundamentals is used to analyze the price series. The results of 
this dissertation reveal that EU ETS is functions well. Carbon has a price that 
reflects to a large extent the market fundamentals in the study period. The 
markets are maturing even if not fully informational efficient yet. Interactions 
with electricity markets are close. The impact of price of carbon on the price of 
electricity is positive but spatially uneven. In the long run, also climate change 
affects the electricity bill.  
The first study of this dissertation investigates the price determination in the 
market. The empirical results based on years 2005–2011 show that the price of 
the EUA is largely determined by the market fundamentals. Especially the price 
of coal, gas, oil and the price of German electricity are reflected in the price of 
EUA. In the second study we build up forecasting models and use a trading 
simulation to study the informational efficiency of the market. Results reveal that 
the market is not fully efficient but maturing. There might have been possibilities 
to make economic profit during the second period in the EU ETS market.   
The last two papers focus on the interaction of emissions trading with electricity 
markets. The third study looks at the impact of EUA price on the integrating 
European electricity markets. The electricity markets are integrating but the 
positive impact of carbon price on the electricity price is uneven depending on 
the fuel mix in regional electricity markets. The last study analyses the impact of 
increasing mean temperature due to climate change and the EUA price on the 
electricity bill in the EU. Warming climate affect the electricity bill unevenly: in 
the southern European countries the bill is expected to increase due to the 
increased demand for cooling, whereas the northern and central parts of the 
continent may face decreasing costs as the winters get warmer. 
Key words: Climate change, EU ETS, price determination, market efficiency, 
electricity market, time series econometrics 
 
Hinta hiilelle – ekonometrisia esseitä Euroopan unionin 
päästökaupasta ja sen vaikutuksista 
 
Piia Aatola     
 
Tiivistelmä 
Väitöskirjassa tutkitaan Euroopan unionin ilmastopolitiikan keskeisen ohjaus-
keinon, päästöoikeuskaupan toimintaa ekonometrisin menetelmin. Päästökauppa 
on kustannustehokas tapa vähentää päästöjä. Se luo hiilidioksidille hinnan ja 
kannustaa siirtymään puhtaampiin tuotantomuotoihin. Väitöskirja tuottaa uutta 
tietoa päästökauppamarkkinoiden toiminnasta ja tehokkuudesta. Päästökaupan 
toiminnan tunteminen ja markkinoiden tehokkuuden arvioiminen on tärkeää. Se 
auttaa markkinatoimijoita valitsemaan päästöoikeuksien ostamisen ja oman 
tuotannon päästöjen puhdistamisen välillä. Viranomaisille ja ympäristöpolitiikan 
säätäjille se paljastaa ainutkertaista informaatiota puhdistamisen rajakustan-
nuksista, joka muutoin on yritysten yksityistä tietoa.  
Jotta päästökauppa toimisi halutulla tavalla, markkinoiden tuottaman hinta-
signaalin tulee olla luotettava ja markkinoiden tehokkaat. Väitöskirjan tulokset 
osoittavat, että tutkimusperiodin 2005–2011 aikana EU:n päästökauppamarkkinat 
toimivat hyvin. Ensimmäisessä esseessä tarkastellaan hinnan määräytymistä 
markkinoilla. Työssä osoitetaan, että päästöoikeuden hinta heijastelee markkina-
fundamentteja. Empiiriset tulokset vuosilta 2005–2011 osoittavat, että funda-
menttitekijät, kuten sähkön ja polttoaineiden hinnat selittävät merkittävän osan 
päästöoikeuden hinnan vaihteluista. Toisessa esseessä tutkitaan päästöoikeus-
markkinoiden tehokkuutta kaupankäyntisimulaation avulla. Tulokset osoittavat, 
että päästöoikeusmarkkinoilla olisi ollut mahdollista tehdä taloudellista voittoa 
toisella kauppakaudella. Tämä viittaa siihen, että kehittyvät päästökauppa-
markkinat eivät olisi vielä toimineet täysin informaatiotehokkaasti. 
Kolmannessa esseessä keskitytään tarkastelemaan eurooppalaisten sähkömarkki-
noiden integraatiota ja arvioimaan, kuinka päästökaupan mukaantulo on vaikut-
tanut siihen. Hintasarjojen integroituvuutta tutkimalla todetaan, että alueellisten 
sähkön hintojen välille löytyy pitkän aikavälin tasapainorelaatioita eli yhtenäisten 
sähkömarkkinoiden luominen on kehittynyt. Päästökaupan vaikutus sähkö-
markkinoihin kuitenkin vaihtelee. Pääasiallinen vaikutus päästökaupasta sähkön 
hintaan tulee sähköntuotannon hiilidioksidipitoisuuden kautta: mitä hiili-
intensiivisempää tuotanto on, sen suurempi on päästöoikeuden hinnan vaikutus 
myös sähkön hintaan. Päästökaupan mukaantulo voi siten aluksi jopa eriyttää 
sähkönhintoja. 
Ilmastonmuutoksen myötä sähkönkulutuksessa tapahtuu alueellisia muutoksia ja 
sähkön kysyntä muuttuu niin ilmastoinnin kuin lämmitystarpeenkin osalta. Työn 
viimeisessä osajulkaisussa osoitetaan, että ottamalla huomioon ilmastonmuutos-
skenaarioiden mukainen ilmaston lämpeneminen sekä päästökaupan vaikutus 
sähkön hintaan, sähkölasku tulisi nousemaan Etelä-Euroopassa kun taas Pohjois-
Eurooppa voisi säästää leudontuvien talvien ansiosta lämmityskuluissa, jos 
viilennystarve ei nouse liian suureksi. 
Asiasanat: Ilmastonmuutos, päästökauppa, markkinoiden tehokkuus, 
sähkömarkkinat, ekonometria 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the main 
instrument in EU climate policy. In global perspective, it is an ambitious and 
genuinely large-scale trading program. For instance, it is ten times larger in 
number of participants than the largest program in the U.S., the SO2 trading 
program. Emissions trading was included in the toolbox of EU policy 
instruments after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Trading started 
officially in 2005 with a three-year trading period (2005–2007). The following 
year marked the beginning of the Kyoto period, which brought internationally 
binding emissions reduction targets; this period ended in 2012. The EU 
Commission has already made decisions on the arrangements for the third trading 
period (2013–2020). Thanks to its country-specific data on initial allocations, 
annually reported emissions, continuous data on forward prices and increasingly 
available data on spot prices, the EU ETS provides a very interesting object of 
research on environmental policies. 
The theoretical background of emissions trading lies in the economic theory of 
internalizing externalities and achieving the socially optimal quality of the 
environment. Pigou (1932) introduced the idea of levying a tax on emissions to 
make polluters bear the full social cost. In contrast to Pigou, Coase (1960) 
emphasized that when all the property rights are well defined, the Pareto 
optimum solution can be found without governmental intervention by allowing 
the participants to bargain. As an instrument, emissions trading combines the best 
aspects of both approaches: society retains the property rights to a clean 
environment and sells permits to polluters at a price that reflects the social cost of 
pollution. In doing so the instrument implements the reduction in a cost-efficient 
way.  
The roots of the literature on tradable property rights lie in the work of Dales 
(1968) and Crocker (1966), who, following Coase (1960), proposed that society 
has the right to clean air and a social planner can allocate permits for pollution. 
Montgomery (1972) demonstrated analytically that the system of tradable 
permits is cost-efficient, as it equalizes the marginal abatement costs between 
polluters. Montgomery’s findings are based on perfect competition in the permit 
market. These first contributions spawned an extensive literature on tradable 
property rights that went on to examine the implications of imperfections, 
transaction costs, as well as monitoring and enforcement.1 The first experiences 
                                              
 
1 Hahn (1984) examined the role of a dominant firm in the permit market. Misiolek and Elder (1989) 
focused on the case where firms have market power both in the permit and end product market. Innes et 
al. (1991) and von der Fehr (1993) extended the discussion to oligopolistic settings. Both cases threaten 
the cost-efficiency properties of a trading system. Stavins (1995) was the first to examine the role of 
transaction costs and he was followed by Gangadharan (2000) and Liski (2001). The role of uncertainty 
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of emissions trading are from the US, where authorities have run many trading 
programs since the 1970s.2 Europe’s turn came 30 years later. Today, the EU 
ETS is a large-scale trading program even in global terms.  
The flexibility of permit trading created by the free trading of allowances and the 
reduction in the asymmetric information between the actors and the policy 
planner has increased the popularity of the system. The most important long-term 
feature of permit trading is that it creates a price for pollution. One prerequisite 
for a credible price signal is a well-defined institutional framework: a 
standardized commodity, trading rules and trading platforms. The auditing and 
supervision of the system must also be sufficient in order to establish credibility. 
The price signal is important for many agents and for several reasons. For 
installation operators, or the polluters, the price facilitates both short-term 
optimizing decisions on abatement and long-term investment decisions. For 
policy makers, it reveals unique private information on marginal costs. For the 
social planner, it provides information that indicates the stringency of the policy 
and may suggest adjustments in it.  
Despite the promises of permit trading, there are many challenges in the 
emerging market for CO2 emissions in the EU ETS. Thus far, the EU ETS has 
created a price and market for carbon as well as incentives for emissions 
reductions. The system is a liquid market that has grown rapidly in its first years 
but one that is still maturing and new. There are, however, many challenges 
related to the nature of price determination, market efficiency and the interaction 
of the system with other markets.  
I examine these issues by combining analytical models with empirical 
econometric models on time series data from the first years of the ETS. The main 
research questions of this thesis are: 
• Is the permit price determined by the market fundamentals?  
• Is the EU ETS market mature? That is, can it be regarded as informational 
efficient? 
• How do the common EU ETS market and the price of carbon impact the 
regional and integrating electricity markets? That is, do we witness 
convergence or divergence in electricity prices in the presence of a carbon 
market?  
                                                                                                                                    
 
has been examined in many forms. Montero (1998) combined the effect of both uncertainty and 
transaction costs. Monitoring and enforcement have been analyzed by Malik (1992) and Ben-David et al. 
(2000). Finally, various issues related to design have been examined in Böhringer and Lange (2005a, 
2005b); Cason and Gangadharan (2003).  
2 SO2 trading program, Title IV of the Clean Air Act 1993 California’s RECLAIM (Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market), See the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, 2012 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/index.html 
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• How does the changing climate and carbon market affect the demand for 
electricity and on the electricity bill in Europe? 
 
This thesis contributes to the growing literature that examines empirically the EU 
ETS during its first years. The studies in the theses shed light and provide new 
information on this policy instrument. The results are interested for both actors in 
the market and for the policy planners. As the tendency in the international 
climate policy is also towards more global carbon trade and the markets are 
getting linked to each other, the experience and research on the functioning of the 
EU ETS is provides valuable insights.  
In a set of four essays, I examine these questions analytically and empirically 
using large data sets. The main objectives of the theses can be summed up as 
follows. The first essay focuses on the main price drivers and determinants of an 
EU ETS permit, or EU allowance (EUA). This work builds on that by Alberola et 
al. (2008), Chevallier (2009), Christiansen et al. (2005) and Hintermann (2010). 
Based on a robust statistical analysis, we test theory-driven hypotheses on the 
impact of market fundamentals on changes the price of an EUA. We conclude 
that the German baseload electricity price and gas and coal prices are the main 
and statistically significant fundamentals of the price of EUA. In the second 
essay, we examine the informational efficiency of the ETS market through a 
trading simulation. The work on market efficiency is closest to that of Daskalakis 
et al. (2008) and Montagnoli and de Vries et al. (2010). Showing signs of price 
predictability and profitable trading possibilities during the second trading period 
the results support the hypotheses of lacking informational efficiency in this 
emerging market.  
The third paper looks at the interactions between Europe’s integrating electricity 
markets and the ETS market. Bosco et al. (2010) and Zachmann (2008), among 
others, have studied the integration of the European electricity markets. In the 
interactions with the EU ETS market and the electricity market, reference is 
made to the research of Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) and Fezzi and Bunn 
(2009). These approaches are combined in studying the impact carbon market on 
the integrating electricity market. The overlap of the two harmonizing internal 
markets should lead to increased efficiency. However, the price of carbon affects 
regional electricity prices unevenly due to the differences in energy mixes and 
the merit order of power plants. This might, in the short run, disperse the 
electricity prices despite the trend towards integration driven by the increasing 
transmission capacities on the continent. The last essay examines the impact of 
the carbon market on the changing demand for electricity and on the EU’s 
electricity bill. The changing climate and electricity production have spatially 
varying impacts on that bill. The results show that in the southern European 
countries the bill is expected to increase due to the increased demand for cooling, 
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whereas the northern and central parts of the continent may face decreasing costs 
as the winters get warmer.  
All in all, the results of this thesis suggest that the price of an EUA reflects the 
market fundamentals and that the ETS market is liquid and operationally efficient 
but shows signs of informational inefficiency. In addition, the ETS is shown to 
be closely linked to the electricity markets: the price of an EUA has a positive 
but uneven impact on the integrating electricity market prices on the continent. 
Depending on the energy mix and emission factor of the marginal power plant, 
the impact of the price of an EUA on the price of electricity varies.  
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2. Literature review 
The EU ETS provides an excellent object for empirical studies on the impacts of 
environmental policies; it is no wonder that the literature is already extensive. 
Given the focus of this thesis, this literature is presented under two main 
headings: Price determination and emissions reductions and market efficiency 
and market interactions. The first encompasses price determination and the 
second market efficiency and impacts on other markets. 
2.1 Price determination and emissions reductions 
Market price is an indicator of scarcity and it reveals a great deal of information. 
For the participants in the ETS market, the price creates incentives to reduce 
emissions and avoid the costs of permits and, optionally, sell for profit any extra 
permits they may have acquired. For the authorities, the market price serves as a 
signal of the success of the policy and possible needs for adjustments in the 
system. The reliability and validity of the price is thus crucial for the very 
existence of the incentive mechanism of the instrument. If uncertainty makes the 
market price too volatile or if market power is used to manipulate the price, the 
credibility of the price signal suffers and might hinder participants from taking 
actions they might otherwise take. The market price should thus be stable enough 
to be a reliable signal for emission reduction and investment decisions. 
Accordingly, the price determination and the driving forces behind the market 
price are well-motivated questions, ones that have been studied in the previous 
literature. Christiansen et al. (2005) describe and identify the possible price 
determinants as being policy and regulatory issues as well as market 
fundamentals, including the emissions-to-cap ratio, fuel-switching, weather, and 
production levels. Alberola et al. (2008), Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) were the 
first to analyze these relationships econometrically. Delarue and D’haeseleer 
(2007) highlighted the importance of fuel-switching in electricity production as a 
price fundamental. Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) and Bredin and 
Muckley (2011) included electricity prices in the set of possible price 
determinants. Fezzi and Bunn (2009) and Creti et al. (2012) used cointegrating 
analysis for the interdependencies between the price of an EUA and the energy 
market prices.  
A range of studies has investigated many other aspects of the market as well. 
Examples include Hintermann (2010), who explains the price development in 
terms of the marginal abatement costs. Chevallier (2009) studied the relation 
between macroeconomic factors and the price of carbon. Mansanet-Bataller et al. 
(2011) focused on the price spread between certified emission reductions, CERs, 
and EUAs, and Paolella and Taschini (2008) use econometric models to study the 
very special period of EUA returns when the price was falling to zero due to a 
surplus at the end of the first trading period (2005–2007). 
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The price signal creates incentives for emission reductions. How much emissions 
are reduced and what actions are taken to that end is defined by the marginal 
abatement costs. But the reductions also depend on the time span. In the short 
run, the choice of fuel in electricity production is the key means to reduce 
emissions. Switching from a more - polluting to a less-polluting fuel is one of the 
few short-run abatement options that the actors have under the EU ETS. Fuel-
switching can only be used where the technical requirements (e.g. multi-fuel 
combustion) and the economic incentives exist. The largest potential for fuel-
switching has been in the UK and Italy. (Delarue et al. (2008) and Pettersson et 
al. (2011)). In practice and on the largest scale, fuel-switching means replacing 
coal with natural gas, which produces only half the emissions compared to coal. 
The popularity of gas is increasing in Europe and globally even though coal is 
keeping its position as the most important fossil fuel in electricity production. In 
the long run, the cost of carbon might also affect larger energy investment 
decisions. To date, the price of carbon has neither been a driving force for 
investments in large-scale energy projects nor caused substantial carbon leakage 
within the process industries from Europe to areas with fewer carbon constraints 
(Wråke et al., 2012; Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2012). 
2.2 Market efficiency and market interactions 
For a market to serve as an efficient policy instrument it needs to be well 
functioning. A well-functioning market mechanism allocates scarce resources 
efficiently from the surplus sector to the deficit sector, equalizing supply and 
demand. The demand for EUAs is defined by the marginal abatement cost of 
companies. The authorities according to the policy target set the supply of 
allowances. The tradability of permits allows the market mechanism to work 
towards maximizing social welfare. A well-functioning market needs to be 
allocative, operational and informational efficient. The market price might be 
biased if the market is not informational efficient. Informational efficiency is of 
particular interest in new and emerging markets. A market is informational 
efficient if the price reflects all the available information and adjusts quickly to 
new information; that is, the price and return are not predictable and it is 
impossible to make a constant economic profit in the market. (Fama, 1970, 
Timmermann and Granger, 2004). The market return should be a random-walk 
process. Emerging and new markets often suffer from informational inefficiency 
and may offer opportunities for arbitrage if a company can beat the market by 
using the information at hand. Usually these characteristics fade quickly as the 
market evolves. The first studies of informational efficiency in the EU ETS were 
those by Daskalakis and Markellos (2008), Milunovich and Joyeux (2010) and 
Chevallier (2009). These papers tested for the weak form of informational 
efficiency and found no clear evidence of efficiency in any form in the first 
phase. Montagnoli and de Vries (2010) studied EUA prices in both phases I and 
II using variance ratio tests and their results show signs of market efficiency 
during phase II. Miclaus et al. (2008) used the event study methodology to 
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examine the effect of the announcements of the national allocation plans and the 
publication of emissions verifications on the carbon prices. They found that the 
market was efficient during the first phase. Conrad et al. (2012) also studied the 
adjustment of the EUA price to news announcements. Using high-frequency 
intraday data and modeling the volatility, they concluded that the price of an 
EUA adjusts well to news of economic development. In addition, in a 
corresponding market – the US SO2 market – Albrecht et al. (2006) found 
evidence of the weak form of informational efficiency by applying the standard 
statistical tests. 
Operational efficiency in the permit market requires that the institutional 
structure be well defined and the trading rules are harmonized. The market needs 
to be liquid and have enough traders; compliant and speculative, as well as 
bearable transaction costs (see e.g. Jaraite et al. 2010). This guarantees that 
permits will move from the surplus to deficit sector and that the marginal 
abatement costs will be equalized; in other word, the market will also be 
allocatively efficient. Ellerman et al. (2010) and Zhang and Wei (2010) provide 
insights into the operating mechanism and economic efficiency of the EU ETS. 
Ellerman and Joskow (2008), Egenhofer et al. (2011), Wråke et al. (2012) review 
the institutions and give a perceptive assessment of the first years of the ETS.  
The electricity sector is the single largest sector in the EU ETS and thus 
interactions with it have been widely studied and debated. The increase of 
production costs in polluting production aims at creating an incentive to move 
towards less-polluting, cleaner technology. However, despite the importance of 
incentives for policy, much of the discussion of the impacts of permit trading on 
the electricity market has centered on the pass-through rates (e.g. Sijm et al. 
2006, Zachmann and Hirschhausen (2008), Walker (2006), Oberndorfer et al. 
(2010)) and windfall profits (e.g. Lise et al. 2010 and Woerdman et al. 2009). 
Electricity producers pass the carbon cost on to the end product prices, and given 
the relatively inelastic demand, the extra cost is often passed on almost entirely. 
The impact of the price of carbon on the price of electricity depends on, among 
other factors, the carbon content of the marginal fuel. These windfall profits 
caused by carbon-driven, higher electricity prices have been the focus of the 
policy debate.  
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3. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme  
3.1 Institutional framework    
The development of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been 
interesting. The system was drafted in the aftermath of the signing of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997. An international emissions trading scheme was listed in the 
Protocol as one of the mechanisms to achieve the agreed emission reduction 
targets. It was in this setting that the EU decided to build up its own emissions 
trading system. After a couple of years of negotiations within the EU institutions, 
the ETS was established in 2003 (EC, 2003/87/EC). This relatively rapid process 
in EU decision making shows the commitment and role that the system gained in 
European climate policy; it became the flagship of that policy. One of the 
challenges has been the overall trade-off between the flexibility and uncertainty 
of the mechanism. On the one hand, the system seeks to provide predictability, 
allowing market actors to boost their investments; on the other, the possibility to 
adjust the mechanism according to changes in international climate policy is 
essential as well.  
From 2005 onwards, ETS compliant installations have been required to have 
permits for their CO2 emissions. One European Union emissions allowance, or 
EUA, equals one ton of CO2. The first trading period, 2005–2007, was dedicated 
to learning the trading mechanism and no internationally legally binding 
commitments were imposed; however, the second trading period, 2008–2012, is 
concurrent with the Kyoto compliance period. The third period will be slightly 
longer than the earlier ones, running from 2013 to 2020. Despite the current 
impasse in the international climate negotiations of the post-Kyoto period, the 
EU has committed itself to continuing the market mechanism as part of its 
climate policy (see Hermeling et al. 2013 for the assessment of EU 2020 targets 
and role of EU ETS).  
The ETS is a cap-and-trade market. The cap, the total number of allowances 
allocated to the market players, is determined by political decisions in the 
European Commission in line with the climate policy target set for the ETS 
sector. After receiving their allowances, in accounts, actors are free to trade in 
them. In Phases I and II the allowances were allocated to the participants mostly 
free of charge. By contrast, from the beginning of phase III, auctioning will 
gradually become the main initial allocation method for most of the participants. 
(see Benz et al. (2010) for the assessment of auctions in Phase 3). 
The scheme covers the CO2 emissions of approximately 12,000 installations and 
over 500 companies in the energy production and energy-intensive process 
industries. These account on average for 50% of the EU’s CO2 emissions. 
Electricity production is the largest single sector in the system and it covers over 
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45% of the allocated allowances. Of the member states, Germany, France, Italy 
and Poland have been allocated the largest share of the allowances. The 
Commission and the member states cooperate closely in supervising the system. 
All the trades and permit transfers must be registered in the actors’ accounts in 
the national and EU-wide registers, and the emission balance sheets are audited 
annually in March. All actors must show that their emissions do not exceed the 
quantities permitted by the allowances in their account. If an actor fails to do this, 
it must pay a penalty of 100 €/CO2 ton and buy allowances corresponding to the 
exceeding. After the installation-level reporting, the Commission publishes the 
emission data online yearly. These data are publicly available from the 
transaction log and provide a large database for anyone interested. (European 
Commission Transaction Log, CITL, 2012)  
The actual trading takes place in several exchanges and via brokers. In one sign 
of a liquid and maturing market, trading is executed using various spot and 
financial instruments, such as forwards and options and spreads of EUAs. The 
forward trade via brokers is the most liquid form of trade, but the role of trade via 
exchanges is growing rapidly. In addition to the compliance traders, there is a 
large number of speculative traders operating in the market, among them banks 
and investment funds. The market is open to any actor that has an account in one 
of the national registers. (State and Trends of Carbon Market, 2011). 
After the initial allocation of EUAs the market supply is increased by the credits 
coming from the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint 
implementation (JI) projects. These credits are called certified emission 
reductions (CER), and emission reduction units (ERU), respectively. The CDM 
and JI are baseline and credit-based emission trading within the framework of 
Kyoto Protocol. These projects are conducted together with developing countries 
and the addition of emissions reduction programs is the key to getting credits 
from these projects. The use of these credits in the EU ETS market is regulated 
by the linking directive (EC, 2004/101/EC).  In the 2008-2012 trading period, the 
EU laws allow operators to use JI/CDM credits up to a percentage determined in 
the National Allocation Plans (NAP). Unused entitlements are transferred to the 
next trading period, 2013–2020. In 2008–2012, participants in the ETS have been 
able to buy a total of as much as 1.4 billion tons in credits. As of 2013, the EU 
ETS legislation will change such that between 2008 and 2020 participants may 
use credits in an amount up to 50% of the overall reductions below 2005 levels 
made under the ETS. The exact amount per operator is to be determined in line 
with the methodology outlined in Directive 2009/29/EC. The system by which 
CDM/JI credits are brought to the EU ETS market has been struggling, but the 
role of these credits, especially CERs, in adding to the supply in the market has 
been substantial. (State and Trends of Carbon Market, 2011). 
.  
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3.2 Phases I and II of the EU ETS market  
The first years of the EU ETS have shown that the market mechanism works, and 
carbon now has a price. However, the development of the scheme has been 
plagued by concerns of overallocation of allowances, price manipulation and 
register fraud. In addition, the uncertainties of the institutional framework and 
climate policy have made the market price volatile and impeded investments in 
clean technology. At the same time, however, the ETS has witnessed a rapid 
increase in trading volumes and in the number of participants in the market. This 
is clearly reflected in the price development and the emissions data for the first 
years.  
A total of over two billion allowances were allocated annually to the actors in the 
market during the first trading period, 2005–2007. Emissions were slightly less 
than two billion tons and thus the price of an allowance fell to zero before the end 
of the phase. During the second period (2008–2012) the cap has been tightened 
and it is to be tightened even more in the coming years. Based on the verified 
emissions for the year 2011, the market is now cumulatively long by 
approximately 280 Mt; that is, there has been 280 Mt less emissions than the 
allocated allowances would permit. Recently, the price of an EUA has fluctuated 
between 5€ and 8€ per ton. (ThomsonReuters, 2012). For a detailed review of the 
first years of the EU ETS, the reader is referred to, among other sources, 
Ellerman and Joskow (2008), Egenhofer et al. (2011) and Wråke et al. (2012).  
Table 1 shows the emission balance for the first years of the EU ETS. The first 
period ended approximately 160 Mt long. The second period is expected to have 
an even larger surplus, due to the economic downturn and decreased demand for 
allowances. However, the possibility of banking and borrowing allowances in 
coming years will keep the price at positive levels. Combustion installations 
(including the energy sector) have long been the only sector short in allowances, 
that is, the only one where emissions have been higher than the number of 
allowances granted to the sector would permit. In contrast, the process industry 
has been the main source of the surplus on the market.3 
 
 
 
                                              
 
3 The prediction of third period scarcity of allowances is threatened and there is a on-going debate of the 
EU Commission intervention to the market by setting aside some of the allowances from the market to 
guarantee the scarcity of allowances in the deeper than expected production reductions due to market 
downturn. (ThomsonReuters, 2012) 
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Table 1.  Allocation of permits vs. emissions by sector (Mt).  
Source: CITL, 2012. 
 
 
How are these figures reflected in the market prices? Figure 1 shows the price 
development of the allowances in all three periods. The first-period price 
approached zero far before the end of the period in 2007. This was due to the 
joint effect of overallocation of allowances and actual abatement, which caused a 
surplus in the market (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008, Anderson and Di Maria, 
2011). The second period permit price has been less volatile, but the economic 
turmoil in late 2008 and early 2009 is reflected in the EUA price as well. The 
recession caused production and emissions levels to decrease and thus the 
demand for and price of permits decreased as well. The third period prices follow 
the second period prices closely, as so many aspects of the third period are still 
uncertain and banking of allowances from the second period to the third are 
allowed. Emissions forecasts for the third period are based on the expected 
economic growth rates in the EU area. The surplus is most likely to be consumed 
by the middle of the third phase, and the price estimates and predictions for the 
third period are between 15 and 20 € per ton. (ThomsonReuters, 2012). At this 
writing, it seems that the possibility of banking and borrowing will keep third 
period price levels close to the current second period forward prices. The value of 
the EU ETS market was approximately 120 billion USD in 2010, having 
increased from a value of 8 billion dollars in 2005. (State and Trends of the 
Carbon Market, 2011). 
Activity 2005 2006 2007 Phase I 2008 2009 2010 2011 Cumulative Phase II 
Combustion installations (>20 MW) 10.1 -21.3 -26.1 -37.2 -253.44 -114.01 -126.67 21.41 -472.71
 Mineral oil refineries 8.1 8.9 8.6 25.6 -1.58 7.47 14.80 33.14 53.84
Metal industry 39.0 31.3 34.0 104.2 57.36 107.05 83.04 105.74 353.19
Mineral industry 18.6 13.7 8.9 41.1 28.83 77.73 76.87 100.92 284.35
Production of pulp, paper and board 6.9 7.1 8.5 22.5 7.05 11.59 10.31 13.38 42.33
Total 82.9 39.9 36.1 159.0 -161.53 94.20 59.46 292.11 284.25
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Figure 1.  Price series of three different permits during the study period. 
Source: ThomsonReuters, 2012. 
 
Despite seven years of active trading, the market is still developing and many 
aspects of it need to be reconsidered and modified if it is to give a more accurate 
price signal. To improve the reliability of the price signal, the Commission has 
decided to implement several changes and improvements for the third period. 
The most influential changes will be the longer trading period and the change of 
the main allocation method from grandfathering to auctioning. Allocation will be 
carried out at the EU-level and not by the member states, and national registers 
will be replaced by a single EU-level register to avoid the problems of VAT 
fraud and IT hacking that the system encountered during the first period. 
Moreover, new greenhouse gases and sectors are included in the system. In 
addition, the process of linking the ETS with other emissions trading schemes 
towards a global carbon price is ongoing. (State and Trends of the Carbon 
Market, 2011). 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
€/
tC
O
2
Phase I (EUA Dec 05 - EUA Dec 07)
Phase II (EUA Dec 08 - EUA Dec 12)
Phase III (EUA Dec 13)
13 
 
 
4. Data and econometric models  
4.1 Time series data 
Time series data represent a compound of observations of a statistical variable 
made successively in time. Time determines the order of the observations. The 
statistical analysis of a time series is based on the fact that a time series is 
interpreted as a realization of a stochastic process. A stochastic process { }t tx ∞=−∞  is 
a sequence of random variables indexed in time t. We are interested in the 
conditions under which we can treat the stochastic process as a random sample as 
the sample size goes to infinity. Stationarity is a characteristic of the sequence of 
moments of a distribution. A time series process { }t tx ∞=−∞  is covariace stationary if 
it is true for its moments that 
[ ]tE x = μ       (1) 
2( )tVar x = σ       (2) 
( , ) ,t s t sCov x x t s−= ≠γ      (3) 
Equations (1) – (3) indicate that the process has a constant mean and variance 
and that the covariance is not dependent on the time, but only on the distance 
between t and s. A stationary process thus does not exhibit characteristics of 
deterministic or stochastic trends, systematic variation in variance, deterministic 
seasonality or changes in internal structure.  
The time series data used in this thesis consist of price series data on daily, 
weekly and monthly bases from varying time spans from 2003 to 2011. The main 
data sets are the price series for an EUA, fuel prices (coal, gas and oil prices) and 
European electricity prices. Figure 2 describes the key variables as daily 
observations. The data sets are presented in detail in each of the essays. The 
series seem to follow relatively similar time paths and thus anticipate high 
correlation levels, the correlation being particularly high between regional 
electricity prices. They follow each other closely but only at different levels. The 
price of electricity in the Nordic countries has traditionally been below the 
central European price due to the high proportion of hydropower in the north. 
Recently, however, price levels have converged within Europe as transmission 
capacities have increased (Weigt, 2009). 
Fuel prices also appear to be closely related. As a global commodity with a world 
market price, coal has had a stable price for a long time. However, the increasing 
demand in China and logistical problems caused a price spike in 2008. The 
economic recession later brought the price back to its long-term levels. The price 
of gas has been more volatile and as a local product it is more sensitive to 
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changes in the market. Its correlation with the price of an EUA is the highest of 
that for any of the fuels. This might be due to the central role of fuel-switching 
for the ETS participants in emission reductions. We use the difference in prices 
between gas and coal as a proxy for fuel-switching. The gas price is also often 
indexed to the oil price, which reflects the economic situation quite closely. 
Economic growth seems to be the main driving force of market fundamentals 
such as electricity and fuel prices and thus the price of an EUA as well. 
Electricity and energy prices are also affected by weather fundamentals. 
(ThomsonReuters, 2012).4 
 
Figure 2.  The main data variables of the thesis.  
Source: ThomsonReuters, 2012.  
 
                                              
 
4 All prices are converted to euros using the relevant exchange rates. Fuels are converted to €/GJ. The 
EUA price is the compound of the yearly forwards. Electricity prices represent the baseload yearly 
forwards from EEX and NordPool. Gas is the UK winter gas price forward and coal (CIF ARA2) is the 
world market price for a yearly forward. Oil is the Brent oil yearly forward. 
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There are several ways to examine the character of the time series. Eyeball 
econometrics suggests that the series in Figure 1 is non-stationary, but only 
proper tests can confirm this.  Studying the correlograms and running unit root 
tests for the series reveals the stationarity of the series. Based on autocorrelation 
and partial autocorrelation functions, the correlograms bring to light the 
autoregressive and moving average characteristics of the series. Correlograms 
show the correlations between two points in time. If there is no correlation in 
time, the process has no memory and is thus stationary. If, however, the process 
has a memory that is evolving in time, it is said to have a unit root. A linear 
stochastic process has a unit root if one is a root of the process's characteristic 
equation. The most common tests for determining whether a process has a unit 
root or exhibits stationarity are the Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1981), Phillips-Perron (Phillips and Perron, 1988) and KPSS 
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) tests. These are the ones used in our applications  
Figure 3 shows the EUA price in stationary form, which is obtained by taking the 
logarithm of the first difference. The EUA price series in level (see Figure 1 and 
2) is non-stationary, integrated of order of one, I(1). It has to be differenced once 
to obtain a stationary series. In general, a non-stationary series is integrated of 
order d, I(d) if it becomes stationary after being differenced d times. A stationary 
stochastic process has many favorable properties in estimation work and it is a 
prerequisite for obtaining consistent estimates with least-square estimations. The 
stationary assumptions may seem restrictive, but many processes can be 
transformed into stationary form. These transformations include taking 
logarithms, differencing, eliminating outlying observations, and decomposing 
series. Of these, the most commonly used in our applications are differencing and 
taking logarithms. But we also use seasonal decomposition, affected by 
employing seasonal dummies and eliminating outlying observations according to 
the influential observation statistics. 
 
Figure 3.  The log-differenced price of EUA.  
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4.2 Applications in this thesis  
This section presents the basic features of the applied econometric models. The 
models, data and the statistical tests used in each sub study are presented in more 
detail in each paper.   
Classical linear regression model 
The multiple linear regression model as shown in equation (4) is the point of 
departure for the empirical part in this thesis. We are basically interested in the 
relationship that the independent variables 1 2, ,..., kx x x  have with the dependent 
variable ty . This relationship is summarized by the β parameters that are to be 
estimated. 
1 2
1 1 2 2
( , ,..., )
...
t k t
K K t
y f x x x
x x x
= +
= + + + +
ε
β β β ε     (4) 
tε  is the random disturbance term that captures the effect of all omitted variables 
on the dependent variable. The observed value of ty  has thus two parts, a 
deterministic part and the random part. The objective is to estimate the unknown 
parameters of the model and use data to study the validity of theoretical 
propositions. How the parameters should be estimated depends critically on what 
is assumed about the stochastic process that has led to the observations of the 
data in use. (Greene, 2003) 
The focus of this thesis is on the analysis of multiple time series, with the 
estimations run using the classical ordinal least squares (OLS) method and its 
extensions. As a simple estimation technique, OLS is widely used in the 
econometric literature. OLS is applicable under a set of assumptions regarding 
the underlying data-generating process. These assumptions of linearity, full rank, 
exogeneity of the independent variables, homoscedasticity, as well as the non-
autocorrelation and normal distribution of disturbances, make the interpretation 
of the OLS estimators straightforward. (Greene, 2003). If the assumptions hold, 
OLS produces efficient (minimum variance) and consistent (unbiased mean) 
estimators. If, in addition, the residuals are normally distributed, OLS coincides 
with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation.  
In the first paper, we estimate the log-differenced price of a EUA using market 
fundamentals. We use the log-linear functional form and test the hypotheses 
derived from the analytical model. All the data series are transformed into the 
log-differenced stationary form, in which the coefficients can be interpreted as 
cross-commodity elasticities. We include lagged variables in the model, applying 
a common feature of time series data. Lagged variables bring dynamics into the 
models and, where causality is dynamic, may allow us to interpret the causal 
17 
 
 
relationships underlying price adjustments. The right lag order for the variables is 
tested for using information criteria tests.5 
Instrument variables models 
In the first paper, the price of electricity is one of the explanatory variables in 
estimating the returns of the EUA price. Economic reasoning suggests this might 
cause a problem of endogeneity. The way of causality runs between the price of 
EUA and electricity is not straightforward. So the assumption of exogeneity of 
the independent variables with the dependent variable does not hold any more 
and this might cause OLS to produce biased estimators. We address this problem 
by using instrument variables. Using stock variables related to electricity 
production, such as water reservoirs, gas storages and the economic growth as 
instruments for the electricity price, we can avoid the endogeneity problem. 
Instrument variable models are run in two stages with a two-stage least squares 
(TSLS) procedure. In the first stage the endogenous variable is regressed on the 
instrument variable. This estimate is then on the second stage used as the 
independent variable to get the unbiased instrument variable estimate.  
In order to maintain the assumptions of efficient and unbiased estimations, the 
chosen instruments, tz , must fulfill two properties: valid instruments must be 
relevant and exogenous; that is, the correlation between the instrument and the 
endogenous variable must be non-zero (5a) and the instrument must not correlate 
with the models’ error term (5b).  
( , ) 0t tcorr z x ≠      (5a) 
( , ) 0t tcorr z =ε      (5b)  
The correlation between the variables can be tested using the weak instrument 
tests. To ascertain whether the instruments exhibit exogeneity, we ran the weak 
exogeneity test for all instrument variable models. The Cragg-Donald statistic is 
proposed by Stock and Yugo (2005) as a measure of the relevance of the 
instruments in an instrument variable regression. Exogeneity of the instrument 
variables is not fully testable. In case we have more instruments than necessary, 
we can perform a so-called J-test for over-identifying restrictions. This tests 
whether all instruments are exogeneous assuming that a least one of the 
instruments is exogenous. The J-Test will therefore not necessarily detect a 
situation in which all instruments are endogenous. (Hansen, 1982). 
 
 
                                              
 
5 Akaike and Schwarz (Bayesian) information criteria. (See e.g. Greene, 2003). 
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Vector autoregressive models 
In order to get robust estimations and to avoid setting a priori assumptions on the 
stationary time series regarding endogeneity or exogeneity of the variables, we 
also estimate the system of price relationships with a vector autoregressive model 
(VAR), which estimates the linear dependences between multiple time series as a 
generalization of the autoregressive models. In a VAR model several equations 
are run simultaneously to find out how they react to shocks of other variables. In 
general, a VAR model is of the form  
1
1
p
t i t t
i
X X U
−
=
′= + Φ +η      (6) 
where  x 1tX m=  is a vector of endogenous variables, η , a vector of 
deterministic and exogenous variables, and iΦ  is a  x m m  coefficient matrix. tU  
is the error process. VAR models were originally introduced by Sims (1980) as a 
criticism towards the large structural models with identification restrictions. 
VAR models do not need any expert knowledge but can be estimated without a 
prior assumption of the structure of the problem. 
VAR models are widely used in the macroeconomic applications. In this thesis 
they are applied in their two other primary functions namely for testing Granger 
causality and impulse responses. With the Granger causality test, we can study 
the relationship and the predictability between the time series (Granger and 
Newbold 1986). Granger causality does not reveal structural causality between 
the variables; it only tells whether adding one variable improves the 
predictability compared to autoregressive (AR) models. We can extract three 
different outcomes for Granger causality: unidirectional causality, bidirectional 
causality and independence, meaning exogeneity of prices. Sims (1980) points 
out that a necessary condition for X to be exogenous of Y is that X fails to 
Granger-cause Y. 
In VAR analyses it is standard practice to report impulse responses and forecast 
error variance decompositions. These are more informative in understanding the 
relationships than the VAR regression coefficients or R2 statistics. The variance 
decomposition (forecast error decomposition) is the percentage of the variance of 
the error made in forecasting a variable due to a specific shock at a specific time 
horizon. Impulse responses reflect the response of current and future values of 
each of the variables to a one-unit change in the current value of one of the VAR 
errors.  
In VAR estimation the determination of the lag length is essential to avoid 
residual serial correlation, which is tested with the standard LM-test. The right 
lag order can be tested for by information criteria, an LR test or log likelihood 
tests. Also crucial, in addition to the lag length, is the order of variables, for it 
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might affect the results impulse response results. Accordingly, it is important to 
use the generalized impulse response functions proposed by Pesaran and Shin 
(1998), which are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the system.  
Vector error correction and cointegration models 
By transforming the non-stationary series into stationary form, one loses the 
possibility to interpret the long-run effects. To capture those effects – the long-
term equilibrium –estimation with non-stationary data is needed. In the third 
essay, we study the electricity and EUA price series in their non-stationary form 
to investigate the integration of the electricity markets and the impact of the price 
of carbon on converging electricity prices. Even with non-stationary time series, 
one might find stationary cointegrated relationships between the variables. 
Cointegration analysis makes it possible to estimate non-stationary data without 
running into problems of spurious regression. Cointegration analysis examines 
possible common trends between the variables. If the series move together, they 
share a common trend and are cointegrated.  
If all the variables in a VAR model are I(d) with d>0  (non-stationary) we can 
apply the cointgeration method for estimations. With the Johansen (1988) 
cointegration method, we can write the basic VAR model as in the equation (7) 
to separate the long-run, , and short-run, , effects. 
1 1 1 1 ( 1)...t t t k t k tX X X X− − − − −Δ = Π + Γ Δ + + Γ Δ + ε    (7) 
where 1( ... )kI A AΠ = − − − −  and 1 2( ... )i iI A A AΓ = − − − −  , 1,... 1i k= −  
Π  is a (  x )K K   matrix. The rank of αβ′Π =  defines the number of cointegrating 
relations, r, in the data. The rank is chosen based on the trace and eigenvalue 
tests.6 If Π  has a full ´rank, r K= all the variables are stationary in levels, if 
0r =  there are no stationary linear combinations. For 0 r K< < there are r 
cointegration vectors of stationary linear combinations of ty . After finding the 
cointegrating relations we can impose them to the reduced vector error correction 
(VECM) model and write it in the following way: 
                                              
 
6 Trace test testes the hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors with a following test statistics  
trace
1
ˆln(1 )
n
i
r
r Tλ λ
+
= − −       (*) 
The maximum eigenvalue test has a null hypothesis of r and the alternative hypothesis of r+1 
cointegrating vectors 
max 1
1
ˆ, 1 ln(1 )
n
r
r
r r Tλ λ +
+
+ = − −      (**) 
In (*) and (**) T is the number of observations and λˆ  is the eigenvalue of the matrix Π .  Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) provide critical values for both tests. 
Π Γ
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1 1 1 1 ( 1)..t t t k t k t tX X X X Cd u− − − − −′Δ = + Γ + + Γ Δ + +αβ    (8) 
Equation (8) shows the long term equilibrium relation and short term adjustment 
coefficients with the cointegrated vector error correction model where the 
deterministic factors ( td ), dummy variables and constant affect the short run 
dynamics of the price series that revert towards the equilibrium vectors 1tXβ −′  
according to the adjustment coefficientα .  
The decomposition of the matrix 'αβΠ =  as a product of two (K x r) matrices is 
not unique and thus it crucial to impose restrictions to get identified and stable 
cointegration relations. In our case the restrictions are imposed based on the 
theoretical hypotheses. If the restrictions are binding, we get identified relations. 
One has to also normalize the vector on one of the variables to get easily 
interpretable results. We can set restrictions on both  α  and β . By setting 
restrictions on β  we can test e.g. the degree of market integration or the law of 
one price. With the restrictions on α  we can test the long term weak exogeneity 
of a variable. If a variable is weakly exogenous the other variables are not 
affecting it but it is driving the other prices. With the weak exogeneity test it is 
possible to identify the driving forces behind the common trends. (Lütkepohl, 
2007). 
GARCH models 
Our papers on price determination (Essay I) and informational efficiency (Essay 
II) use daily and weekly data. With high frequency financial data volatility 
clustering is common. Volatility clustering refers to an observation where large 
changes follow large changes and small changes follow small ones – in both 
signs. (Mandelbrot, 1963). Volatility clustering can be seen in Figure 3 in the log 
returns of the EUA. The other data series have similar characters. To address this 
feature we apply the generalized autoregressive heteroscedasticity models known 
as GARCH models, which incorporate a separate equation for the variance of the 
residual term, to be estimated simultaneously with the mean equation. The 
original contributions are by Bollerslev (1986) and Engle (1982). GARCH(p,q) is 
a model where q is the order of the autoregressive term and p stands for the 
moving average term. Models used in the analysis are in general of the following 
form: 
2,   t t t t t tX Z v′= + =φ ε ε σ     (9a) 
and  
σ t
2
= ω + α i ε t−1
2 + β jσ t− j2
j=1
q
i=1
p
    (9b) 
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where tX  is the dependent variable, tZ , is a matrix of explanatory variables in 
the mean equation (9a), and (9b) shows the conditional variance, 2tσ , of the error 
term that is regressed on its lagged values and the lagged values of the squared 
error term of the mean equation. tv  is an i.i.d. sequence with zero mean and unit 
variance. 7  
Model diagnostics 
In the empirical work it is standard procedure to run post-estimation tests to 
check the model fit, coefficient significance, and stability. In time series analysis, 
the most important step is to run residual diagnostics. This applies to all of the 
models discussed above. Serial autocorrelation can be tested in several ways. 
Two common tests that are applicable in our papers are the Q-statistic and the 
Breusch-Godfrey LM-test. They overcome limitations that the basic Durbin-
Watson test faces, and are preferred in most applications. Correlograms and the 
Ljung-Box Q-statistics are often used as a test of whether a series is white noise 
(Ljung and Box (1978)).The Breusch-Godfrey LM-test belongs to the class of 
asymptotic tests known as Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests. Unlike the Durbin-
Watson statistic for AR(1) errors, an LM-test may be used to test for higher-order 
ARMA (autoregressive and moving average) errors and is applicable whether or 
not the model includes lagged dependent variables. Heteroscedasticity of the 
residuals affects not only the serial correlation, but also the estimations. Ordinary 
least squares estimates are consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity, but 
conventionally computed standard errors are no longer valid. We run all the 
models with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance (HAC) 
with a Newey-West estimator. (Newey and West, 1987). 
                                              
 
7 GARCH-M (Engle, Lilien and Robins, 1987) and EGARCH-M (Nelson, 1991) are models to capture 
the volatility clustering in the price series. These models allow one to study the relationship between the 
market risk and expected returns. In the GARCH-M models, the conditional variance of the return is 
added as an independent variable in the mean equation to explain the conditional return. δ  in (*) 
captures the effect that the higher variability in ε t  has on the return. We use the GARCH-M model, 
which is described with the following mean equation:  
2't t t tX Z= + +φ δσ ε      (*) 
The exponential general autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model by Nelson (1991) 
is another extension of the GARCH model. EGARCH models allow the volatility to react in an 
asymmetric way to changes in the volatility. It has been shown empirically that volatility tends to rise in 
response to a decrease in returns and fall in response to an increase in returns (see e.g. Pagan and Schwert 
(1990), Engle and Ng (1993)). Now the conditional variance for an EGARCH in ARMA (p,q)  form is 
2 2
1 1
log( ) [ ( )] log( )
p q
t j t i t i t i j t j
k j
E
− − − −
= =
 = + + − +  σ ω α ε γ ε ε β σ   (**)
     
with lag of order p and q respectively. 
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The post-estimation tests and diagnostics vary if the model is used for forecasting 
purposes rather than for finding causal relationships. This is the case in the 
second paper, in which we build up models forecasting EUA returns to detect 
signals in the trading simulation. We build up several forecasting models with the 
fundamental variables. The selection of a forecasting model is based on the 
accuracy of the resulting forecast rather than on the model fit or statistical 
significance of the coefficients. In our case, the model selection criteria include 
the rolling and recursive root mean square forecasting error (RMSFE), the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and adjusted R2. The choice of criteria in 
selecting a model is not, however, straightforward. Inoue and Kilian (2006) have 
proven that using information criteria (IC) would be consistent, under suitable 
conditions, with choosing the best forecasting model, whereas calculating the 
RMSFE (rolling or recursive) might end up suggesting over-parameterized 
models.  
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5. Summaries of the essays 
5.1 Price determination in the EU ETS market: theory and 
econometric analysis with market fundamentals 
In the first paper, we investigate the price determination and development in the 
EU ETS market during its first five years (2005–2010) in action. The EU ETS 
covers the energy sector and energy-intensive industries, which encompass over 
12 000 installations within the EU. The first five years of trading have shown that 
the system works well and has reduced emissions below the cap. Market 
development has not been without difficulties, however. For instance, during the 
first phase (2005–2007), the over-allocation of permits affected market 
development and price formation, showing up as high volatility and eventually a 
zero price. Yet, even though the first phase suffered from these problems, it 
served its purpose as a learning-by-doing period quite well (see e.g. Ellerman and 
Buchner, 2008; Egenhofer et al. 2011).  
More specifically, we ask to what extent the permit price reflects market 
fundamentals, that is, abatement possibilities, end product prices and production 
costs. To develop hypotheses for the econometric analysis, we build an analytical 
model of permit market equilibrium given stochastic permit prices and risk-
averse firms. Drawing on Holthausen (1979), we assume that firms hedge against 
the uncertain permit price. The firms engage in forward trading to manage their 
portfolio so that their production and abatement decisions can be made using the 
expected value of the allowance forward price. We test the model empirically 
using econometric time series models.  
Our analysis differs from that in previous studies in several respects that yield 
more adequate and robust estimations. First, unlike previous studies on emissions 
permit prices, our research combines insights from a theoretical model with 
empirical estimations to get a robust view of the market and price estimates.  
Second, to get robust results and to avoid the problems caused by possible 
endogeneity of electricity prices we employ three different econometric models 
to estimate the permit price: OLS, IV and VAR models. Third, we use a whole 
daily data set with no breaks from the very beginning of the trading period to the 
end of 2010, during which time the development of the market was rapid and 
price volatility quite high. Finally, and in contrast to many empirical papers 
relying on spot data (e.g. Alberola et al. (2008) and Rickels et al. (2007)), we use 
forward price data throughout the data set to underline the nature of the market, 
where risk-averse firms hedge by forward trading. This has an additional 
advantage: forward trading is far more liquid than spot trading and we can 
therefore expect that forward trading better reflects the fundamentals. Forward 
trading has accounted for 80–90% of the trading in the market, and spot trading 
for only 10%. (State and Trends of Carbon Market, 2011).  
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5.2 Informational efficiency of the EU ETS market – a study of price 
predictability and profitable trading 
In this second essay, we investigate the informational efficiency of what was a 
new and emerging EU ETS market. If the market is information-efficient, the 
best predictor of the next period’s price is the current price; the rest of the price 
evolvement is just white noise. Thus, predicting the price of an EU Emission 
Allowance (EUA) provides no systematic economic profits, meaning that the 
returns can at most cover the risk premium and transaction costs. These 
definitions of informational efficiency stem from theories introduced in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Seminal contributions include the studies by Roberts 
(1967), Fama (1970) and Jensen (1978), the last of whom describes a market as 
efficient if the market price reflects all information and adjusts immediately to 
any new information.  
In this paper we examine the informational efficiency of the EU ETS market by 
focusing on the first category, that is, the return predictability, in Fama’s 
classification of informational efficiency. In contrast to weak form efficiency or 
event studies, no standard test procedures exist for examining predictability. We 
base our analysis on the innovative definition of efficient markets provided by 
Timmermann and Granger (2004). Following this definition we use, for the first 
time in the emissions trading literature, trading simulations as a means of 
examining informational efficiency. In our simulation, the information set, Xt, 
includes the price series that most probably are connected to the EUA price, such 
as electricity prices or fuel prices. Search technology, St, refers to the model 
selection criteria and the choice of buying and selling signals. Thus, our model 
set, Mt, and trading strategies consist of a large number of strategies that traders 
could have adopted in the EU ETS markets. We use three set of models: 1) 
technical analysis models, 2) fundamental-based regression models and 3) 
GARCH models. 
This is the first study to examine the efficiency and, in particular, the 
predictability of the price of an EUA using a trading simulation. We find that if 
traders had used a large set of models in their trading analysis toolbox and, in 
particular, had combined the models, profitable trading during the first years of 
the EU ETS would have been possible, a situation indicating that the market was 
not information-efficient at that time. These results give insights into the progress 
of the new climate policy market mechanism. 
5.3 Impact of the carbon price on the integrating European electricity 
market 
In this paper, we investigate market integration within the four different 
electricity markets representing six price areas in the EU in the presence of two 
policies: EU ETS and integrating electricity markets. We study these questions 
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using the price data from February 2003 until August 2011 for different regional 
electricity markets: the Nordic countries, the UK, Central Europe and the Iberian 
Peninsula. We investigate the focal issues in sub-periods to see how the 
interdependences have evolved over time. Our research questions and hypotheses 
are the following: How has the EU ETS market affected the integration of the 
European electricity markets and convergence of electricity prices? How is the 
price of an EUA reflected in the long-run relations between electricity prices? Do 
the prices share a common trend?  
As a common, EU-wide market the EU ETS creates a new cost factor for fossil-
fuel-based electricity production. This cost factor may impact regional electricity 
prices differently due to differences in the energy mixes. Yet, at the same time, 
the integrating electricity market and increasing transmission capacities create 
incentives for electricity prices to converge. We estimate the long-run price 
relationships between the different prices before the implementation of the EU 
ETS (2003–2004) and during the two phases of the system (2005–2007) and 
(2008–2012). We expect the integration of electricity prices to be stronger during 
the latter parts of the periods studied due to the increasing transmission capacities 
and institutional building in the single EU-wide electricity markets. 
To study these questions, we derive a theoretical framework for the residual 
demand and supply for a competitive profit-maximizing firm operating in the 
energy market and engaging in emissions trading. From this analysis we derive 
the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical work. There we incorporate the 
hypotheses into the examination of market integration and the law of a single 
price, addressing these questions using methods for time series analysis. We start 
with a simple correlation analysis and pairwise Granger causality analysis to 
elicit the relationships between the variables. Then we run a cointegrated VAR 
model with multivariate time series based on cointegration analysis as described 
in Johansen (1988). We study the common trends within these markets and 
examine the variance decompositions to find the price relationships and driving 
forces.  
To our knowledge, this is first study to look at the impact of the carbon market 
on the integrating electricity markets. By studying these questions, we shed light 
on the integration and price convergence process in these strongly related 
markets. The results that show integration among the prices has improved over 
time and that, in line with our hypotheses, the impact of the price of an EUA on 
the electricity prices has been a positive but uneven one. In the short run, the 
price of an EUA might even disperse the prices, whereas in the long run 
increasing transmission capacities and the incentive of the carbon price will 
accelerate the price convergence.  
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5.4 Climate change and electricity consumption – witnessing increasing 
or decreasing costs? 
Climate change affects the need for heating and cooling. This paper examines the 
impact of a gradually warming climate on the need for heating and cooling using 
an econometric multivariate regression model for five countries in Europe along 
the south–north line. The predicted changes in electricity demand are then used 
to analyze how climate change will impact the cost of electricity use, including 
carbon costs. 
The two research questions of the paper are the following. First, will the 
electricity demand increase or decrease in the five countries? Second, how large 
will the costs associated with the expected change be, measured in terms of the 
estimated electricity and carbon prices? To answer these questions we estimate 
the response of electricity consumption to heating and cooling degree days in 
each country using historical data with a country-based multivariate regression 
model. Drawing on these estimates, we use regional climate projections 
(PRUDENCE, 2004), which are scaled by global projections taken from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Meehl et al., 2007). 
Uncertainties in climate projections are taken into account using three IPCC 
SRES emission scenarios (A2, A1B, and B1) for the period 2008–2050, 2007 
being the baseline. Estimated temperature increases are used to assess the 
expected change in electricity demand. Finally, we estimate the costs of the 
anticipated gradual temperature increase as a sum of electricity and carbon 
prices. 
We follow previous analyses in estimating the impact of temperature on 
electricity consumption, but extend those studies by estimating the future impacts 
of climate change as well. Furthermore, unlike Amato et al. (2005) and Ruth and 
Lin (2006), we assess both the costs of electricity use and the associated carbon 
costs using country-specific information on the marginal fuel in electricity 
production. Our main findings are that in central and northern Europe a decrease 
in heating due to climate warming will dominate and thus costs will decrease 
both for users of electricity and in carbon markets. In southern Europe, however, 
climate warming and the resulting increase in cooling and the demand for 
electricity will exceed the decreased need for heating and will thus increase costs 
overall. The main contributors are the role of electricity in heating and cooling 
and the climatic zone. 
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6. Conclusions 
This thesis contributes to the empirical literature on the EU ETS market. By 
analyzing the market based on analytical and empirical models the essays shed 
light on the first years of the new market. For the EU ETS to serve as a policy 
instrument that reduces emissions, the markets should be well functioning and 
produce a credible price signal. The essays comprising this thesis study 
efficiency and price determination in the market. The results provide insight of 
the functioning of this policy instrument.  
The results of the first study, based on analyses of time series data, reveal that the 
EUA reflects the market fundamentals in line with the hypotheses from the 
relevant theoretical framework. In the second essay, we build up a trading 
simulation model to study the market’s informational efficiency. The simulation 
brings to light possibilities for profitable trading and thus reveals a lack of 
informational efficiency in the market during the second trading period (2008–
2012). The third and fourth essays demonstrate the close relationship between the 
carbon and the electricity markets. The carbon price is shown to have a positive 
impact on the electricity price: as the price of carbon increases, the price of 
electricity increases as well. How strong this impact is depends on, among other 
things, the marginal fuel in electricity production. Carbon has a greater impact on 
the production of coal-based electricity than, for example, gas-based.  
The main goal of the EU ETS is to price carbon and internalize the pollution 
externality into that price. The system is one of the first-large scale attempts 
worldwide to do so. The price of an EUA gives a signal and incentive for 
compliant participants in the ETS to seek carbon-free solutions for production 
and reduce their emissions. In the short run, this means switching fuel in 
electricity production; in the long run the price of carbon might affect 
investments. For policy planners, the price of carbon provides unique insights 
into the private costs of the energy sector as well as possibilities to adjust policy 
to meet overall emission reduction targets.  
The EU ETS has created a price for carbon, but its ultimate goal is to have a 
global price for carbon in order to avoid what has been an uneven cost burden 
across multinational industries. Linking the EU ETS with other carbon markets 
around the world is the next step towards a global carbon market and a single 
global price for carbon. There is a long way to go before this goal is achieved, 
however, even though the ETS and market-based instruments have recently 
become more popular in environmental policy. The harmonization of trading 
rules and institutions within the EU alone has been a challenge; including more 
actors would make the task even more demanding.  
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There are several options for extending empirical research on the carbon market. 
The tight relationship between the electricity markets could be studied more 
closely by modeling the two markets simultaneously; for example, relaxing the 
assumption of competitive markets in the EU ETS and end-product markets 
would offer exciting empirical research questions. A study of data on how the 
overlapping of the ETS with other policy instruments, for example, the 
promotion of renewable energy with feed-in tariffs, impacts the price of carbon 
would probably yield some interesting results as well. In addition, applying other 
econometric models and larger data sets would be useful as robustness checks of 
the results obtained to date.   
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